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Summary	
	
The	prioritization	of	selected	economic	activities	through	a	broad	consultative	process	is	often	considered	a	
central	aspect	of	 research	and	 innovation	policies	aiming	at	promoting	smart	specialization	 (RIS3).	This	 is	
seen	 as	 an	 effort	 to	 reduce	 fragmentation	 and	 a	way	 to	 increase	 the	 impact	 of	 research	 and	 innovation	
investments	on	regional	and	national	development.	This	note	argues	that	targeting	research	and	innovation	
policies	may	not	be	always	recommendable	due	to	 inherent	problems	of	 incomplete	 information	and	the	
inevitable	representation	bias	towards	incumbent	interests.	When	the	economic	specialization	of	a	region	is	
not	evident	 from	observation	of	market	dynamics,	policies	 should	aim	at	enabling	 the	process	of	market	
selection,	 allowing	 such	 specialization	 to	 emerge	 as	 a	 result	 of	 entry,	 exit	 and	 experimentation.	 Such	 an	
approach	would	have	two	immediate	implications	for	the	development	of	RIS3:	(i)	replacing	the	emphasis	on	
ex	 ante	 definition	 of	 activities	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 a	 results-based	 approach	 for	 research	 and	 innovation	
investments;	 and	 (ii)	 fully	 integrating	monitoring	 and	 evaluating	mechanisms	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	
strategy,	allowing	for	policy	experimentation,	structured	 learning	and	systematic	adjustment	of	programs	
and	policies	towards	the	pre-defined	objectives.		
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Introduction	
A	balanced	regional	development	has	always	been	a	priority	for	social	cohesion	in	the	European	Union	(EU)	
and	 resources	 were	 consistently	 made	 available	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 (EC)	 to	 Member	 States’	
catching	up	with	leading	economies.	Resources	concentrated	mainly	in	the	EU	Structural	Funds	are	supposed	
to	 help,	 in	 particular,	 the	 convergence	 of	 lagging	 regions	 within	 Member	 States.	 	 Structural	 funds	 are	
disbursed	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 “Operational	 Programs”	 and	 have	 been	 used	 to	 finance	 innovation	
policies,	among	other	investments.	In	this	sense,	innovation	policies	have	been	an	important	component	of	
the	EU	regional	development	strategies3.	
Research	and	innovation	policies	also	became	one	of	the	main	tools	available	to	promote	economic	recovery	
and	sustain	growth	in	recent	years.	 	The	Lisbon	Agenda	established	a	target	for	R&D	expenditures	(3%	of	
GDP)	that	was	subsequently	confirmed	by	the	Europe	2020	Strategy.	 	 In	2010,	the	European	Commission	
announced	 the	 availability	 of	 €	 6.4	 billion	 for	 research	 and	 innovation	 --	 the	 largest	 budget	 ever	made	
available	–	while	urging	Member	States	to	strengthen	their	policies	and	programs	to	reduce	the	innovation	
gap	between	the	EU	and	other	world	leading	economies	(The	European	Commission	Europe	2020	Flagship	
Initiative	Innovation	Union	(Innovation	Union)	--	COM(2010)546)).	
The	 adoption	 of	 a	 “smart	 specialization	 strategy”	was	 one	 of	 the	 recommendations	 put	 forward	 by	 the	
Innovation	Union	flagship	initiative	to	increase	the	impact	of	research	and	innovation	policies	of	Member	
States	on	economic	growth.	It	builds	on	the	ideas	developed	in	David,	Foray	and	Hall	(2009),	which	include	
‘increasing	the	correlation	between	R&D	and	training	specialization	and	the	structures	of	the	economy’;	and	
facilitating	 economic	 “self-discovery”	 through	 a	 broad	 governance	 driven	 and	 fact	 based	 consultative	
process.4	Member	States	have	been	 therefore	encouraged	 to	define	 research	and	 innovation	policies	 for	
smart	specialization	strategies	(or	simply	RIS3).			
The	Commission	proposed	that	the	submission	of	a	Smart	Specialization	Strategy	be	an	ex	ante	conditionality	
for	access	to	Structural	Funds	in	the	2014-20	period.5	 	The	Partnership	Agreement	of	each	Member	State	
with	the	Commission,	to	be	signed	in	2013,	will	determine	the	thematic	objectives	and	the	monitoring	and	
results	framework	to	trace	the	performance	of	each.	In	this	context,	a	number	of	client	countries	as	well	as	
the	European	Commission	 (EC)	have	expressed	 interest	 in	cooperating	with	the	World	Bank	to	 foster	 the	
policy	 dialogue,	 practitioner	 exchange	 and	 peer	 networks	 to	 support	 the	 design,	 implementation	 and	
evaluation	of	Smart	Specialization	Strategies.	
This	 paper	 focuses	 on	 a	 rather	 specific	 aspect	 of	 the	 smart	 specialization	 agenda,	 as	 it	 concentrates	 on	
understanding	 research	 and	 innovation	 policies	 for	 smart	 specialization	 (RIS3)	 and	 discusses	 some	 key	
challenges	 entailed	 to	 their	 design	 and	 implementation.	 This	 study	 does	 not	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	
comprehensive	analysis	of	the	concept,	nor	does	it	lay	out	a	full	set	of	indicators	that	can	be	used	to	measure	
smart	specialization.	These	issues	are	tackled	in	a	number	of	documents	produced	by	the	EC,	IPTS	and	the	
OECD	which	complement	this	report.		
																																																													
3	See	Error!	Reference	source	not	found.	for	further	detail	on	the	EU	Cohesion	Policy	instruments.	
4	Knowledge	Economists’	Policy	Brief	no.9:	“Smart	Specialisation	–	The	Concept”;	David,	Foray,	&	Hall,	(2009);	
Measuring	Smart	Specialisation:	The	Concept	and	the	Need	for	Indicators,	David,	Foray,	&	Hall,	(2011);	p.1.	
5	See	Commission’s	Cohesion	Policy	proposal	--	COM(2011)615	for	2014-2020	(Appendix	7.1).	
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This	 paper	does	not	 address	 the	overall	 set	of	 policies	possibly	needed	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 smart	
specialization.	It	reviews	a	series	of	documents	issued	by	the	EC	to	guide	its	Member	States6,	and	builds	on	a	
number	of	recent	efforts	to	inform	this	process,	especially	two	similar	initiatives	prepared	by	the	JRC-IPTS	
(Research	and	 Innovation	Strategies	 for	Smart	Specialization	 (RIS3)	Guide7)	and	 the	OECD	 (TIP	Project	on	
Smart	Specialization,	DSTI/STP/TIP/AH(2012)1).		
The	RIS3	Guide,	in	particular,	presents	a	general	definition	of	the	concept	and	outlines	six	steps	to	establish	
a	national	or	regional	strategy,	starting	with	an	analysis	of	the	economic	specialization	of	the	country	or	the	
region;	continuing	with	the	establishment	of	priority	areas	and	of	the	consultative	process	through	which	
these	priorities	should	be	determined;	concluding	with	the	set	of	monitoring	and	evaluation	mechanisms	
necessary	for	implementation.8			This	paper	fully	supports	the	emphasis	of	the	RIS3	Guide	on	governance,	
transparency	and	accountability	and	its	proposal	that	monitoring	and	evaluation	be	fully	integrated	into	the	
design	and	implementation	of	the	strategy.	
This	paper	explores	circumstances	in	which	targeted	research	and	innovation	policies	may	be	useful,	namely,	
when	information	on	the	economic	specialization	of	the	region	or	the	country	is	fully	or	partially	available,	
through	 some	 sort	 of	 “market	 test”.	 In	 such	 cases,	 research	 and	 innovation	 policies	 may	 help	 sound	
companies	 to	 keep	 a	 competitive	 edge	 in	 international	 markets	 or	 to	 cope	 with	 growing	 international	
competition	 (shaping	 comparative	 advantages)	 or	 simply	 support	 potentially	 high	 growth	 companies	 to	
realize	their	potential	(unleashing	latent	comparative	advantages).		
When	 the	 economic	 specialization	 of	 a	 region	 is	 not	 immediately	 evident	 from	 observation	 of	 market	
dynamics,	 policies	 could	 aim	 to	 enable	 the	 process	 of	 market	 selection,	 allowing	 such	 specialization	 to	
emerge	 as	 a	 result	 of	 entry,	 exit	 and	 experimentation.	 This	 paper	 therefore	 proposes	 that	 research	 and	
innovation	policies	targeting	few	activities	may	not	be	always	recommendable	in	the	first	instance	due	to	the	
nature	of	information	available	to	policy-makers	(incomplete	and	asymmetric).		
The	 informational	asymmetry	mentioned	here	refers	to	the	nature	of	the	decision-making	process	that	 is	
inevitably	 biased	 towards	 “incumbents”	 (and	 thus	 against	 new	 entrants	 or	 potentially	 successful	
entrepreneurs)	 despite	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 consultative	 process.	 As	 a	 result,	 policy-makers	 should	 be	
encouraged	to	enable	innovation	(including	new	business	models)	and	efficient	market	selection	–	a	process	
through	which	successful	companies	will	define	a	new	specialization	pattern	for	the	country	or	the	region.	
Such	 policies	 then	 go	 beyond	 standard	 boundaries	 of	 research	 and	 innovation	 to	 include	 improving	
regulations	to	facilitate	firm	entry;	firm	innovation	and	exports.	In	a	nutshell,	these	are	policies	that	promote	
“high	 growth	 potential	 entrepreneurship”.	 This	 paper	 therefore	 underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
entrepreneurial	 environment,	which	 includes	 (but	 is	 not	 limited	 to),	 entry	 and	 exit	 conditions,	 access	 to	
																																																													
6	Europe	2020	Flagship	Initiative	Innovation	Union;	Regional	Policy	Contributing	to	Smart	Growth	in	Europe;	EU	Budget	
Review;	Europe	2020	Flagship	Initiative	Digital	Agenda;	An	Integrated	Industrial	Policy	for	the	Globalisation	Era;	Proposal	
for	Cohesion	Funds	2014-2020;	State	of	the	Innovation	Union	2011.	(COM(2010)546;	COM(2010)553;	COM(2010)700;	
COM(2010)245;	COM(2010)614;	COM(2011)615;	COM(2011)849)	
7	Most	recent	version	published	in	May	2012.	
8	The	OECD	has	launched	a	discussion	space	for	smart	specialization	with	the	European	Commission	and	the	IPTS	also	
to	elaborate	on	 the	 ‘how	 to’	of	 smart	 specialization.	This	project	aims	 to	guide	 the	design	and	evaluation	of	 smart	
specialization	strategies	at	both	the	national	and	the	regional	levels,	through	the	formulation	of	indicator-based	strategy	
profiles.	 Background	 documents	 from	 these	 activities	 are	 mostly	 available	 online		
https://community.oecd.org/community/smartspecialisation	
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finance	 (especially	 early	 stage	 financing),	 product	 market	 regulation,	 and	 access	 to	 inputs	 in	 the	 smart	
specialization	agenda.	
In	such	cases,	 the	role	of	smart	specialization	should	be	 flexible	and	should	endorse	 iterative	 learning	by	
emphasizing	the	integration	of	monitoring	and	evaluation	mechanisms	in	the	development	of	the	strategy,	
replacing	 the	 emphasis	 on	 targeting	 certain	 activities.	 This	 should	 allow	 for	 policy	 experimentation,	
structured	learning	and	systematic	adjustment	of	programs	and	policies	towards	the	pre-defined	objectives.	
The	strategy	may	consist	of	two	steps:	first,	to	identify	bottlenecks	and	market	failures;	then,	to	experiment	
with	pilot	instruments	based	on	hypotheses.	Impact	evaluation	of	tested	policies	should	lead	to	the	learning	
and	adaptation	processes	which	address	the	bottlenecks	that	were	identified	in	the	first	stage.			
This	paper	is	composed	of	four	other	sections.	The	next	section	defines	the	key	concepts	and	relationships	
drawn	 from	 the	 existing	 documents,	 and	 it	 identifies	 the	 relevance	 of	 targeted	 research	 and	 innovation	
policies	and	a	broad-based	consultative	process	for	RIS3.	The	third	section	discusses	the	challenges	related	
to	incomplete	information	and	consultative	processes.	The	fourth	section	addresses	those	challenges	at	the	
operational	level.	The	fifth	section	focuses	on	the	public	policy	implications.	The	final	section	summarizes	the	
main	conclusions.		
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Research	and	Innovation	for	Smart	Specialization	Strategies	(RIS3):		Definitions	
The	RIS3	Guide	defines	national	or	regional		research		and		innovation		strategies		for		smart		specialization		
(RIS3)		as:		
“integrated,	 place-based	 economic	 transformation	 agendas	 that	 […]:	 focus	 policy	 support	 and	
investments	 on	 key	 national/regional	 priorities,	 challenges	 and	 needs	 for	 knowledge-based	
development,	including	ICT-related	measures;		build	on	each	country's/region’s	strengths,	competitive	
advantages	and	potential	for	excellence;	support		technological		as		well		as		practice-based		innovation		
and	 	 aim	 	 to	 	 stimulate	 private	 sector	 investment;	 get	 stakeholders	 fully	 involved	 and	 encourage	
innovation	 and	 experimentation;	 are	 evidence-based	 and	 include	 sound	monitoring	 and	 evaluation	
systems”.	(RIS3	Guide,	p.	8)	
Smart	Specialization.	The	idea	of	smart	specialization	was	put	forward	as	an	instrument	in	the	Europe	2020	
Agenda9.	It	builds	on	the	concepts	developed	in	Foray	and	van	Ark	(2007)	and	David,	Foray	&	Hall	(2009).	As	
a	 first	 approximation,	 smart	 specialization	 strategies	 can	 be	 understood	 as	development	 strategies	 that,	
building	 on	 existing	 comparative	 advantages,	 promote	 a	 larger	 contribution	 of	 the	 knowledge	 factor	 to	
economic	growth.		At	the	enterprise	level,	the	knowledge	used	by	firms	translates	into	better	processes	and	
products,	new	business	models	or	simply	innovations;	raising	productivity,	exports	and,	in	some	cases,	more	
and	 better	 jobs.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 smart	 specialization	 strategies	 could	 be	 understood	 as	 knowledge-driven	
growth	strategies.	
Knowledge	creation	and	use	(ICT	use,	R&D	investments	and	innovation)	have	been	at	the	core	of	the	Lisbon	
Agenda	and	the	Europe	2020	Strategy.	In	2010,	the	European	Commission	announced	the	availability	of	€	
6.4	billion	for	research	and	innovation	-	the	largest	budget	ever	made	available	for	this	purpose	-	and	urged	
Member	States	to	strengthen	their	research	and	innovation	policies	(“Innovation	Union”10:	COM(2010)546).	
In	this	sense,	RIS3	may	be	defined	as	an	integrated	set	of	measures	(policies,	programs	and	reforms)	aiming	
to	increase	the	impact	of	research	and	innovation	on	economic	growth.	
Knowledge	and	other	productive	assets.	In	order	to	increase	the	effectiveness	of	research	and	innovation	
policies,	 David,	 Foray	 &	 Hall	 (2011)	 propose	 the	 general	 idea	 that	 policy	 makers	 should	 increase	 ‘the	
correlation	 between	 R&D	 and	 training	 specialization	 and	 the	 structures	 of	 the	 economy11’,	 where	 “the	
structures”	refers	to	the	local	economic	activity	in	different	sectors.		By	focusing	on	certain	sectors,	policy	
makers	would	avoid	the	dispersion	of	R&D	funding	and	increase	the	probability	of	matching	research	results	
with	 market	 demand.	 The	 approach	 is	 further	 developed	 in	 the	 RIS3	 Guide,	 which	 proposed	 a	 specific	
framework	 for	 concentrating	 the	 vast	 amount	 of	 resources	 that	 are	 allocated	 to	 R&D,	 innovation	 and	
technology	policies	in	member	countries.	
Regional	development	and	economic	transformation.	RIS3	is	expected	to	be	applicable	at	the	regional	level,	
as	the	cornerstone	of	regional	development	strategies.	The	objective	is	to	trigger	structural	transformation	
in	 the	 regional	 economy	 supposedly	 to	 generate	 a	 ‘cluster	 of	 firms’	 with	 enough	 spillover	 effects	 and	
economies	of	agglomeration	to	transform	the	region	from	‘periphery’	to	a	‘center’.	According	to	the	RIS3	
Guide,	R&D,	innovation	and	technology	policy	should	target	certain	activities	with	the	potential	to	generate	
																																																													
9	COM(2010)2020.	
10	European	Commission	Europe	2020	Flagship	Initiative	Innovation	Union.	
11	Measuring	Smart	Specialisation:	The	Concept	and	the	Need	for	Indicators,	David,	Foray,	&	Hall,	(2011);	p.1.	
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clusters	of	firms	and	thus	the	expected	transformational	effect	as	opposed	to	simply	promoting	scattered	
innovation.	Prioritization	of	sectors	then	becomes	a	core	element	of	RIS3.	
The	focus	of	research	and	innovation	policy	on	smart	specialization	is	even	endorsed	as	a	criterion	for	well-
performing	innovation	systems	by	the	Innovation	Union	Flagship	(Box	1).		
	
Selecting	(targeting)	sectors.	David,	Foray	&	Hall	(2009)	argue	that	target	activities	should	be	those	resulting	
from	 the	 entrepreneurial	 self-discovery	 process,	 as	 defined	 in	 Hausmann	 and	 Rodrik	 (2003).	 This	 is	 the	
decision	 process	where	 entrepreneurs	 discover	 the	markets	 in	which	 to	 operate	 from	 a	 set	 of	 “modern	
sectors”.	This	concept	specifically	rules	out	the	use	of	top-down	foresight	exercises	and	similar	instruments	
in	selecting	the	target-sectors,	emphasizing	the	importance	of	a	“bottom-up”	approach.		
Definition	of	a	“priority	area”.	Smart	specialization	aims	to	target	few	priority	areas	which	are	neither	broad	
sectors	nor	a	single	firm,	but	new	or	existing	activities	with	high	market	potential.	The	proponents	of	the	
smart	 specialization	concept	 support	 that	 this	 is	one	of	 the	distinctive	 features	of	 smart	 specialization	 in	
comparison	to	traditional	industrial	policy.			
The	role	of	broad-based	consultations.	The	notion	of	a	“top-down	approach”	 is	further	developed	in	the	
RIS3	Guide.	The	document	suggests	 that	 research	and	 innovation	policies	should	aim	to	prioritize	certain	
areas	 based	 on	 evidence,	 consultation	 and	 analysis.	 It	 is	 also	 highlighted	 that	 in	 this	 process,	 initial	
stakeholder	consultation	should	involve	all	the	key	players	in	innovative	sectors:	public	and	private	sector	
actors,	academia,	the	civil	society,	peer	networks	and	the	users	of	innovation.	Research	and	innovation	policy	
should	thus	target	sectors	that	result	from	this	process.		
OECD	(2012)	summarizes	the	differences	between	traditional	industrial	policy	and	smart	specialization	as	the	
emphasis	of	the	latter	on	knowledge	and	technology-led	growth,	the	presence	of	a	consultation	process	in	
Box	1:	Features	of	well	performing	national	and	regional	research	and	innovation	systems:	
“[…]	Design	and	implementation	of	research	and	innovation	policies	is	steered	at	the	highest	political	level	and	based	
on	 a	 multi-annual	 strategy.	 Policies	 and	 instruments	 are	 	 targeted	 	 at	 	 exploiting	 	 current	 	 or	 emerging		
national/regional	strengths	within	an	EU	context	(‘smart	specialisation’)		
–						An	effective	and	stable	centre-of-government	structure,	typically	steered	by	the	top	political	level,	defines	broad	
policy	orientations	on	a	multi-annual	basis	and	ensures	sustained	and	properly	coordinated	 implementation.	This	
structure	is	backed	up	by	networks	involving	all	relevant	stakeholders,	such	as	industry,	regional	and	local	authorities,	
parliaments	and	citizens,	thereby	stimulating	an	innovation	culture	and	building	mutual	trust	between	science	and	
society.		
–						A	multi-annual	strategy	defines	a	limited	number	of	priorities,	preceded	by	an	international		analysis		of		strengths		
and		weaknesses		at		national		and		regional	level			and			of			emerging			opportunities			(‘smart			specialisation’)	and			
market	developments,	and		provides		a		predictable		policy		and		budgetary		framework.	The	strategy	duly	reflects	EU	
priorities,	 avoiding	 unnecessary	 duplication	 and	 fragmentation	 	 of	 	 efforts,	 	 and	 	 actively	 	 seeks	 	 to	 	 exploit		
opportunities	 	 for	 	 joint	 programming,	 cross-border	 co-operation	 and	 exploiting	 the	 leverage	 effects	 of	 EU		
instruments.		Bilateral	co-operation	with	non-EU	countries	is	based	on	a	clear	strategy	and,	where	possible,	is	co-
ordinated	with	the	other	EU	Member	States.		
–						An	effective	monitoring	and	review	system	is	in	place,	which	makes	full	use	of	output	indicators,	international	
benchmarking	and	ex-post	evaluation	tools.	[…]”	
	
Source:	Innovation	Union,	Annex	I:		Self	assessment	tool:	Features	of	well	performing	national	and	regional	research	and	innovation	systems	
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which	policy	makers	are	open	to	market	signals	and	the	use	of	market-based	tools	such	as	public	private	
partnerships,	surveys	and	SWOT	analyses	by	the	policy	makers12.	
There	seems	to	be	some	ambiguity	in	the	role	of	the	self-selection	process	and	broad	based	consultations	in	
deciding	on	the	activities	 to	be	 targeted.	The	process	of	self-discovery	 is	 sometimes	presented	as	both	a	
market	and	an	“off-market”	process,	as	for	example	in	the	following	statement:	“It	is	of	crucial	importance	
that	RIS3	governance	bodies	focus	on	a	limited	number	of	innovation	and	research	priorities	in	line	with	the	
potential	 for	 smart	 specialization	 detected	 in	 the	 analysis	 phase	 that	 is	 anchored	 in	 entrepreneurial	
discoveries”	(RIS3	Guide,	p.22).	
Reconciling	 sectoral	 growth	 policy	 with	 regional	 development	 and	 research	 and	 innovation	 policies.		
Designing	and	implementing	smart	specialization	at	the	regional	level	is	a	challenging	task	due	to	the	strong	
forces	 of	 agglomeration	 that	 arise	 from	 fundamental	 differences	 between	 the	 core	 and	 the	 periphery	
(Krugman,	1991).	Regional	boundaries	are	much	more	open	to	accommodating	these	forces	than	national	
boundaries,	 and	 this	 constitutes	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 RIS3	 (McCann	 &	 Ortega-Argiles,	
2011).		
Relocation	of	entrepreneurs.	In	the	presence	of	both	a	diversified	core	and	a	specialized	periphery,	new	
firms	may	find	it	more	profitable	to	locate	in	the	cities	during	the	learning	and	search	process	for	their	ideal	
domain	(Duranton	&	Puga,	2004).		Although	costly,	this	may	allow	firms	to	easily	employ	the	different	kinds	
of	inputs	needed	when	an	experimented	domain	fails	and	a	new	one	needs	to	be	tried.	Such	relocation	
may	curb	the	emergence	of	new	activities	in	the	periphery.		
	
Relocation	of	the	labor	force	which	is	skilled	in	different	domains	than	the	one	prioritized	in	the	region.	
Such	labor	will	be	more	geographically	mobile,	and	is	likely	to	relocate	to	the	diversified	cities	or	to	other	
regions	with	demand	for	their	existing	skills.	Generation	of	local	human	capital	fit	for	the	local	
specialization	will	be	costly	and	may	require	time	to	build	up.	Local	training	programs	which	reinforce	the	
formation	of	general	as	well	as	specialized	skills	may	further	induce	the	emigration	of	locally-produced	
human	capital	(McCann	&	Ortega-Argilés,	2011).	The	question	here	is	whether	countries	are	ready	to	
accommodate	these	effects.	
	
Emphasis	on	ICT.	Another	component	of	the	RIS3	agenda	is	to	implement	policies	which	aim	to	increase	the	
ICT	use.	Since	mid-1990s,	the	EU	has	remained	in	a	catching-up	position	lagging	behind	the	US	and	Japan,	
especially	in	the	field	of	investments	in	innovation	and	technology	while	China	and	the	rest	of	the	developing	
world	have	been	progressing	 fast.	One	of	 the	eleven	thematic	objectives	of	 the	2014-2020	programming	
period	is	therefore	identified	by	the	Commission	as	“enhancing	access	to	and	use	and			quality	of	information	
and	communication	technologies”13.	
Smart	Specialization	Strategy	as	an	“ex	ante	conditionality”.	The	Commission	proposed	the	acceptance	of	
a	Smart	Specialization	Strategy	as	an	ex	ante	conditionality	for	access	to	Structural	Funds	in	the	2014-2020	
																																																													
12	“Draft	Synthesis	Report	on	Innovation	Driven	Growth	in	Regions”	(2012)	
13	See	Annex	II.	
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period.14		The	Partnership	Agreement	of	each	Member	State	with	the	Commission,	to	be	signed	in	2013,	will	
determine	the	thematic	objectives	and	the	monitoring	and	results	framework	to	trace	the	performance	of	
each.	ANNEX	II	presents	the	ex	ante	conditionalities	for	the	use	of	Structural	Funds	in	2014-2020	including	a	
roadmap	for	increasing	the	ICT	use	in	Member	States.	
The	proposed	approach	to	regional	development	 is	 justifiable.	 Inter-regional	 income	disparities	across	EU	
regions	have	not	substantially	narrowed	despite	large	amounts	allocated	through	previous	regional	policies	
(Puga,	2002).15		The	main	cause	for	regional	disparities	between	the	core	and	the	periphery	in	the	EU	relate	
to	 agglomeration	 effects,	 strengthened	 by	 rapid	 innovation	 and	 technological	 advancement	 in	 the	 core	
(Farole,	 Rodriguez-Pose,	 &	 Storper,	 2009).	 The	 transformational	 effect	 aims	 to	 address	 precisely	 this	
structural	problem	and,	ideally,	targeted	research	and	innovation	policies	would	promote	it.		Yet	this	note	
will	argue	that	it	may	be	not	always	feasible.	
	 	
																																																													
14	See	Commission’s	Cohesion	Policy	proposal	--	COM(2011)615	for	2014-2020	(Appendix	7.1).	
15	By	some	measures,	distribution	of	per	capita	income	across	regions	in	the	EU	is	more	unequal	than	across	the	US	
states,	contrary	to	what	one	would	have	expected	given	the	higher	spatial	concentration	of	production	in	the	US	(Puga,	
2002).	
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Incomplete	information	and	the	political	economy	of	lobbying	
In	this	section	we	argue	that,	due	to	 incomplete	and	asymmetric	 information,	a	public	sector	governance	
structure	that	discourages	efficient	risk	management	and	the	collective	decision	making	processes	that	are	
inevitably	biased	 towards	 incumbents’	 interests	may	hinder	 the	government’s	capacity	 to	properly	 select	
sectors	or	products	that	may	induce	an	economic	transformation.		
Competitive	 rent-seeking,	 a	 concept	 whose	 roots	 date	 back	 to	 the	 1970s	 when	 targeted	 policies	 were	
widespread	 (Krueger,	 1974;	 1997),	 explains	 the	 incumbent	bias	 arising	 from	 the	 asymmetric	 information	
problem.	Despite	the	rigor	 in	the	consultation	process	between	the	government	and	the	incumbents,	the	
information	 resources	 available	 to	 the	 policy	 maker	 are	 limited.	 This	 is	 partly	 due	 to	 a	 demand	 side	
coordination	problem:	 in	a	typical	setting,	there	exist	a	very	 large	number	of	consumers,	who	consume	a	
relatively	small	amount	each,	and	a	few	producers	who	serve	all	these	consumers.	There	is	a	strong	incentive	
for	 the	 producers	 to	 lobby,	 disclose	 only	 limited	 information	 and	 compete	 for	 the	 scarce	 government	
resources	to	reduce	their	costs	and	stay	in	the	market.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	much	more	difficult	for	the	
large	number	of	consumers	coordinate	and	lobby	to	enable	a	demand-driven	specialization	strategy.			
The	 capacity	 to	obtain	and	process	 information	 related	 to	 supply	 and	demand	 conditions	 is	 a	 classical	
problem	of	economic	policy	making.	Information-related	problems	are	larger	when	the	products	or	services	
will	only	exist	in	the	future	–	as	in	the	case	of	targeted	innovation	policy.	The	task	becomes	overly	difficult	
when	those	products	need	to	generate	a	“transformational”	effect	–	as	expected	in	the	present	context.	The	
trickier	 part	 here	 is	 identifying	 the	 sufficient	 conditions	 –	 for	 example,	 relevant	 economies	 of	 scale,	 and	
spillover	effects	based	on	existing	comparative	advantages.	 In	 the	1990s,	 the	difficulty	 to	 identify	sectors	
with	the	attributes	that	would	render	targeted	support	justifiable	was	one	of	the	reasons	why	the	“strategic	
trade	policies”	did	not	develop	much	as	a	practical	option.	
The	problem	of	collecting	and	processing	information	about	supply	and	demand,	even	when	the	market	
conditions	are	known,	is	a	classical	challenge	for	economic	planning.	The	best	known	instrument	to	collect	
and	process	information	about	cost	and	preferences,	supply	and	demand,	is	the	market	-	despite	the	well-
established	 case	 of	 market	 failures.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 innovations	 or	 entrepreneurial	 activities	 that	 could	
potentially	lead	to	a	transformation	in	the	economy	by	generating	a	cluster	of	specialization,	the	problem	is	
even	more	severe.		The	reason	is	because	these	activities,	by	definition,	suffer	from	the	inexistence	of	a	price	
and,	more	generally,	 from	missing	markets.	Since	the	product	 is	ex	ante	unknown,	the	market	cannot	be	
created	either.		
Collective	decision	making,	even	when	based	on	a	broad	consultative	process,	does	not	help	much	in	this	
context	 for	 two	 reasons.	The	 first	 is	 asymmetric	 information.	 Self-motivated	 sector	or	project	advocates	
naturally	possess	more	information	about	their	own	sector	or	project	than	policy-makers.		The	quality	and	
relevance	of	information	provided	or	generated	in	this	context	has	inevitably	limited	use	for	decision	making.	
The	second	reason	is	that	representation	in	the	collective	decision-making	process	will	be	biased	towards	
incumbent	political	and	economic	interests.	Incumbents	have	more	incentive	to	voice	or	lobby	(more	to	win,	
clear	 goals,	 and	defined	 coalition)	 as	opposed	 to	new	entrants,	 particularly	 future	entrepreneurs,	 simply	
because	these	entrepreneurs	do	not	exist	at	the	time	of	targeted	policymaking	and	hence	have	no	lobbying	
power.		
The	 critical	 factors	 are	 the	 inexistence	of	market	 generated	 information	 and	 any	 alternative	 source	of	
reliable	information	for	decision	making.	This	is	precisely	the	reason	why	Hausmann	and	Rodrik	(2003)	argue	
in	 favor	 of	 subsidizing	 entry	 into	 new	markets:	 the	 information	 generated	 by	 the	 first-comer	 is	 a	 non-
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proprietary	good	and	can	be	quickly	utilized	by	followers	(imitators).	This	 in	turn	reduces	significantly	the	
returns	 to	 investments	 in	 the	 “discovery”	process,	which	makes	private	 investment	 levels	 inferior	 to	 the	
socially	optimal	(as	in	the	case	of	R&D	investments	for	example).	16	
When	 reliable	market	 information	 is	 not	 available,	 should	 governments	 bet	 public	money	 in	 targeting	
specific	sectors?	One	argument	often	heard	is	that	private	sector	investors,	including	venture	capitalists	and	
serial	 entrepreneurs	 also	 have	 incomplete	 information,	 face	 high	 uncertainty	 and	 still	 profit	 from	 those	
investments.	Could	the	public	sector	not	achieve	the	same	results?		This	is	very	unlikely	given	the	different	
incentive	regimes	under	which	the	public	and	the	private	sectors	operate.		
Private	investors	invest	their	own	resources	(or	they	are	the	agents	of	indirect	investors),	profit	from	success	
and	bear	the	financial	 losses	associated	to	failure,	facing	an	incentive	structure	that	 is	more	conducive	to	
better	 risk	 management	 and	 thus	 entrepreneurial	 success.	 For	 instance,	 private	 investors	 are	 quick	 in	
selecting	a	project	and	bringing	the	financial	and	non-financial	resources	(such	as	mentoring	and	networking)	
required	for	its	development	(to	exit	and	thus	cash	in	the	expected	returns).	Yet,	they	are	also	fast	in	assessing	
the	odds	of	project	success	and	are	eager	to	exit	as	soon	as	failure	is	perceived	as	the	likely	outcome	so	that	
investors’	losses	are	contained.		
Public	servants	invest	tax	payers’	money,	they	do	not	profit	from	its	success,	and	do	not	bear	the	costs	of	
bad	decisions.	Under	these	circumstances,	favoritism	becomes	more	frequent	than	usual.	Instead	of	a	quick	
exit,	support	to	unlikely	successful	deals	will	be	unnecessarily	extended.	Indeed,	as	argued	more	broadly	by	
Rodrik	(2004),	identifying	credible	exit	strategies	is	one	of	the	critical	challenges	for	the	industrial	policy	of	
the	21st	Century.		
The	EU	has	tried	to	address	the	challenges	above	before,	as	for	example,	in	the	case	of	state	aid	regulations	
for	restructuring	sectors.	In	order	to	receive	support	to	restructuring	activities17,	firms	or	countries	are	asked	
to	provide	a	detailed	plan	with	measurable	and	monitorable	milestones	demonstrating	long	term	financial	
sustainability	once	the	support	has	ended.	An	amount	of	subsidy	 is	defined	ex	ante,	and	responds	to	the	
criteria	 of	 minimum	 necessary.	 Based	 on	 these,	 a	 clear	 time	 frame	 is	 set	 with	 a	 defined	 date	 for	 the	
suspension	of	the	subsidy,	after	which	the	firm	is	not	allowed	to	use	similar	support	for	a	long	period.	The	US	
approach	to	the	firms	in	the	automotive	sector	is	another	example	of	direct	support	(with	a	very	different	
governance	structure).	In	most	cases,	however,	such	approaches	are	the	exception	and	not	the	rule	of	policy-
making.	
There	are	circumstances	when	the	lack	of	information	poses	no	serious	risk	to	policy	makers.	We	argue	
that,	depending	on	the	amount	of	market	generated	information,	it	may	not	be	desirable	to	target	R&D	and	
innovation	policies	 to	specific	 sectors.	The	argument	does	not	exclude	 the	possibility	of	 targeting	sectors	
when	market	driven	information	is	sufficiently	available.	In	these	cases,	focusing	R&D	policies	in	sectors	in	
which	the	economy	is	specialized	and	globally	competitive	is	possible	and	may	help	to	increase	the	impact	of	
R&D	and	innovation	investments.	A	schematic	view	is	presented	in	Figure	1.		In	the	next	section	we	develop	
a	tentative	typology	based	on	the	existence	of	evidence	about	the	economic	specialization	of	a	region.			
																																																													
16		 Hausmann	and	Rodrik	(2003)	justify	policy	intervention	in	the	case	where	entrepreneurs	are	searching	for	their	ideal	
domain	of	operation	under	uncertainty	about	costs,	which	depend	on	some	unobserved	productivity	parameter	 for	
each	good	in	the	‘modern’	sector	(p.608).	They	solve	for	the	general	equilibrium	investment	in	the	modern	sector,	and	
show	that	the	decentralized	equilibrium	results	in	underinvestment,	coupled	with	too	high	product	diversification.				
17	An	example	is	the	shipbuilding	sector	in	the	1980s.	
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Figure	1.	Access	to	information,		risk	level	and	policy	making	
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Operationalization	of	RIS3:		Access	to	Information	
In	developing	RIS3,	policy-makers	will	have	to	address	the	type	of	economic	specialization	of	the	region	
and	 its	determinants	or	binding	 constraints.	 Based	on	 the	nature	of	 the	economic	 specialization	and	 its	
underlying	causes	or	“binding	constraints”,	policy	makers	can	decide	whether	research	and	innovation	policy	
is	a	relevant	instrument	to	foster	development	and	if	so	whether	targeted	instruments	are	recommendable	
or	not.	There	is	little	that	research	and	innovation	policies	can	do	to	help	regions	overcome	problems	related	
to	“distance”	or	 lack	of	economic	resources	or	poor	 institutional	 framework	but	there	 is	probably	a	 large	
contribution	in	helping	companies	move	their	products	up	on	the	quality	ladder.	In	this	section	we	assume	
research	and	innovation	are	potentially	relevant	to	focus	on	issues	of	sector	targeting.				
In	what	 follows,	we	present	 a	 simplified	 typology	 relating	 availability	 of	 information	on	 the	 economic	
specialization	of	a	region	to	the	degree	of	convenience	of	adopting	targeted	policies.	We	argued	 in	the	
previous	section	that	the	absence	of	reliable	 information	about	supply	and	demand	is	one	of	the	reasons	
why	the	government	often	avoids	targeting	sectors	and	products.	The	level	of	information	available	on	the	
specialization	of	the	country	or	the	region	is	a	crucial	factor	for	the	future	success	of	targeted	policies.	We	
propose	three	cases	in	which	different	degrees	of	information	about	economic	specialization	imply	different	
chances	 of	 success	 with	 sector	 targeting	 and	 provide	 some	 practical	 examples:	 	 regions	 with	 apparent	
comparative	advantages;	regions	with	latent	comparative	advantage	or	regions	with	unclear	specialization.	
The	argument	is	pictured	in	Figure	1.		
Regions	with	apparent	 comparative	advantage.	These	are	 the	 regions	where	a	 few	globally	 competitive	
industries	are	already	installed.	For	such	regions,	the	key	indicators	and	consultative	processes	should	lead	
to	similar	conclusions	with	regard	to	the	region’s	comparative	advantages.	Yet	regions	of	this	type	may	be	
experiencing	 growth	 or	 decline	 and,	 consequently,	 the	 pattern	 of	 specialization	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	
sustainable.	 Targeted	R&D	 and	 innovation	 policies	will	 “complement	 existing	 productive	 assets”,	 helping	
firms	to	maintain	a	competitive	edge	in	the	sector	by	investing	in	R&D	or	regain	competitive	advantage	lost	
to	new	players	in	the	global	market.	The	RIS3	guide	presents	the	case	of	the	Finnish	pulp	and	paper	industry,	
which	is	increasing	its	R&D	efforts	in	nanotechnology	to	improve	the	efficiency	and	quality	of	production.		
Spanish	CITES,	public	private	laboratories	providing	a	number	of	technology	related	services	to	the	private	
sector,	were	instrumental	in	improving	product	design	and	quality	in	the	local	shoe	industry	thereby	helping	
the	sector	to	refocus	exports	to	high	end	markets	(particularly	Japan).	
	
Box	2	:	How	public	private	partnerships	can	help	to	avoid	inadequate	investments	in	R&D	facilities:		The	case	of	
CITES	
How	can	public	private	partnerships	help	to	avoid	inadequate	investments	in	R&D	facilities?	One	way	of	assessing	
the	private	sector’s	demand	for	knowledge	services	in	a	specific	domain	is	through	“public-private	partnerships	
(PPP)”,	which	allow	the	policy	maker	to	co-invest	in	high-return	projects.	An	example	of	this	kind	of	set	up	is	Spain’s	
program	for	Technology	Centers	(CITEs).	These	centers	are	co-financed	by	the	private	sector	and	the	government,	
in	an	arrangement	where	the	government	financing	is	envisaged	to	phase	out	gradually.	They	have	a	very	
specialized	sector	or	even	product	focus.	CITEs	carry	out	the	following	functions:		
‘(i)	facilitate	the	transfer	of	knowledge	and	existing	technologies	(off-the-shelf)	to	enterprises;	(ii)	address	missing	
links	in	sectoral	value	chains	and	quality	issues;	(iii)	identify	bottlenecks	and	opportunities	for	further	innovation	of	
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products	and	processes	at	the	sectoral	level;	(iv)	facilitate	the	commercialization	of	new	products;	(v)	provide	value	
added	services	not	reasonably	available;	and	(vii)	provide	specialized	training.’	
These	functions	respond	to	the	technological	needs,	as	well	as	skill	formation	or	adaptation,	for	the	specific	area	of	
specialization	in	the	region.		
More	broadly,	in	this	type	of	regions,	the	key	is	to	foster	backward	and	forward	linkages	and	product	differentiation	
to	move	up	in	the	value	chain	by	exploiting	existing	scientific	potential,	fostering	academic	entrepreneurship,	
research	commercialization	and	collaboration	between	public	and	private	sectors.	
	
	
Regions	with	 latent	 comparative	 advantage.	 In	 this	 second	 category	 of	 regions,	 there	 is	 no	 substantial	
economic	 activity	 in	 the	 potential	 area	 of	 specialization,	 but	 the	 required	 knowledge	 ‘partially’	 exists	
typically,	 but	 not	 only,	 due	 to	 (i)	 availability	 of	 a	 non-tradable,	 location-specific	 input,	 such	 as	 a	 natural	
resource,	or	an	immovable	asset	(land	and	climate	for	example);	or	(ii)	local	common	knowledge	about	the	
economic	 activity,	 a	 tradition	 prevalent	 in	 the	 region	 that	 indicate	 potential	 for	 specialization.	 	 Again,	
assuming	that	the	bottleneck	is	related	to	lack	of	knowledge	with	local	content,	R&D	and	innovation	policies	
(and	probably	 investments	 in	skills-formation	and	other	business	development	services)	may	be	useful	to	
‘unleash’	existing	comparative	advantages.	The	cases	of	the	soybeans	industry	in	Brazil	and	of	wine	in	Chile	
are	good	illustrations	of	how	technology	oriented	policies	may	enable	the	development	of	entire	sectors,	
triggering	structural	change.	
	
Box	3	:	The	case	of	soybean	exports	in	Brazil		
Trade	orientation,	entrepreneurship	and	technology	policy	were	the	key	factors	in	Brazil’s	transformation	from	a	
net	importer	into	the	world’s	second-largest	exporter	of	soybeans	in	the	span	of	three	decades.		
In	the	early	1970s,	the	Brazilian	government	encouraged	the	cultivation	of	soybeans	in	the	Southern	region	of	the	
country,	where	a	temperate	climate	and	fertile	soil	seemed	to	provide	adequate	conditions.	By	the	mid-1980s,	
however,	fertile	land	in	that	area	had	become	scarce	and	rental	prices	had	risen.	Agricultural	entrepreneurs	began	
looking	for	alternatives	in	the	then-cheap	and	virtually	unexplored	“Cerrado”	–	the	Brazilian	prairies	–	an	area	
about	the	size	of	France	but	with	completely	different	soil	and	climatic	conditions.	At	that	time,	Embrapa,	a	
government	agricultural	research	institute,	was	instrumental	in	rebalancing	soil	acidity	and	cultivating	crops	
suited	to	the	country’s	tropical	climate,	thereby	expanding	the	area	effectively	available	for	cultivation	of	
soybeans.	Embrapa	now	grows	more	than	200	varieties	of	soybeans	to	suit	the	country’s	diverse	soil	and	climatic	
conditions.		
High	agricultural	productivity	rates	and	the	effective	utilization	of	land	enabled	entrepreneurs	to	explore	new	
export	opportunities.	Access	to	better	and	cheaper	agricultural	inputs,	stemming	from	broad	trade	liberalization,	
were	also	pivotal	in	raising	agricultural	productivity,	and	soybean	exports	in	particular,	after	the	1990s.		
	
	
Regions	 with	 unclear	 specializations.	When	 there	 is	 no	 obvious	 local	 asset	 that	 induces	 an	 economic	
specialization	in	a	region,	information	from	direct	observation	of	market	dynamics	is	not	available	and	sector	
targeting	 becomes	 less	 recommendable	 for	 the	 reasons	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 Under	 these	
circumstances,	we	recommend	that	policy-makers	focus	on	creating	an	enabling	environment	for	efficient	
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market	selection	 (from	which	an	economic	specialization	should	emerge	over	 the	years,	as	a	result).	This	
means	combining	measures	that	promote	firm	entry	and	startups–	possibly	high	growth	potential	 firms	–	
and	allowing	 firm	exit.	Research	and	 innovation	policies	play	a	 central	 role	 in	promoting	entry	but	other	
policies	such	as	facilitating	access	to	credit,	skills	and	information;	and	improving	the	business	environment	
(such	 as	 adopting	 pro-competition	 regulation	 in	 the	 service	 sectors)	 will	 be	 equally	 important.	 When	
economic	 specialization	 is	 not	 evident,	 promoting	 entrepreneurship	 across	 the	 board	 seems	 to	 be	 the	
dominant	strategy	for	policy	makers.	
The	challenge,	therefore,	is	to	define	the	right	policy	mix	and	the	programs	that	better	fit	the	economic	
and	 institutional	 circumstances	 of	 each	 region	 or	 country	 within	 a	 given	 pre-defined	 objective.	 Yet	
predefined	entrepreneurship	policies	do	not	exist	as	such;	rather,	existing	economic	policies	constitute	(or	
not)	an	eco-system	that	is	more	or	less	favorable	to	entrepreneurship	(Acs,	2012).		Overall,	an	eco-system	
that	promotes	entrepreneurship	should	allow	for	the	identification	of	business	opportunities,	provide	the	
right	 incentives	 and	access	 to	 inputs	 required	 for	 their	 development	by	entrepreneurs.	 For	 instance,	 the	
inadequate	regulation	of	the	telecom	or	logistics	sectors	may	preclude	the	development	of	e-commerce;	in	
other	cases,	the	lack	of	early	stage	financing	may	hinder	the	development	of	science-based	startups.		More	
broadly,	countries	and	regions	vary	according	to	their	entrepreneurial	strengths	and	weaknesses.		
	
Figure	2.	Understanding	economic	specialization	
	
In	order	to	identify	the	type	of	a	region,	the	availability	of	information	can	be	assessed	during	the	design	of	
its	smart	specialization	strategy.	Analytical	exercises	that	aim	to	uncover	local	comparative	advantages	may	
provide	consistent	and	reliable	signals	to	the	policy	maker,	revealing	to	the	policy	maker	the	risks	of	targeting	
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specific	 activities,	 and	 if	 such	 risks	 are	 low,	 the	 areas	 of	 specialization	 which	may	 be	 considered18.	 The	
emphasis	here	is	on	the	opposite	scenario,	where	the	policy	maker	does	not	obtain	reliable	information	from	
the	 analytical	 exercise	 and	 should	 draw	 the	 strategy	 on	 uncovering	 the	 latent	 comparative	 advantages	
through	enabling	policies,	which	are	briefly	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
	 	
																																																													
18	Diagnostic	activities	may	include,	but	are	not	limited	to,	analyses	of	trade	competitiveness,	transport	
infrastructure	and	connectivity	with	markets,	economic	geography	aspects,	productivity	and	research	and	
technological	development	infrastructure.	Some	general	tools	for	this	purpose	are	outlined	in	Annex	I.	
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Implications		
Ex	ante	targeting	is	more	likely	to	achieve	its	desired	goals	if	the	region’s	comparative	advantage	is	known	
to	 the	policy	maker.	This	 is	 the	 case	 for	 regions	with	 apparent	 or	 latent	 comparative	 advantage,	where	
information	is	available	about	the	specializations	of	the	region	and	the	risk	of	moral	hazard	and	opportunistic	
lobbying	is	low.		In	these	regions,	specialization	can	be	welfare-improving	as	it	facilitates	the	efficient	use	of	
the	available	resources.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 peripheral	 regions	 with	 less	 clear	 emerging	 or	 existing	 trends	 need	 their	 future	
specializations	 to	 be	 revealed	 through	 a	 flexible	 strategy	 which	 encompasses	 enabling	 policies	 for	
entrepreneurship	 and	 market	 selection,	 rather	 than	 ex	 ante	 targeting.	While	 forces	 of	 agglomeration	
stimulate	the	creation	of	a	diversified	core	and	a	rather	specialized	periphery,	the	challenge	for	the	periphery	
is	to	create	a	suitable	environment	for	entrepreneurship.	This	is	difficult	because	entrepreneurship	is	more	
likely	 to	 flourish	 in	 regions	 where:	 (i)	 a	 diverse	 set	 of	 sectors	 exists,	 (ii)	 many	multinational	 companies	
operate,	(iii)	markets	are	competitive,	(iv)	population	is	dense,	and	(v)	market	potential	is	high	(McCann	&	
Ortega-Argiles,	2011).			
In	these	typically	less	developed	regions,	the	prime	goals	of	the	policy	maker	may	include	facilitating	firms’	
access	to	information,	improving	market	entry	and	exit	conditions,	building	the	infrastructure	for	innovation	
financing	 and	 helping	 the	 buildup	 of	 knowledge	 assets	 (such	 as	 a	 large	 research	 university	 with	
commercialization	potential).	Research	and	innovation	policy	may	focus	on	commercialization	of	research	
through	university-industry	collaboration,	research	startups	and	spin	offs,	improvement	of	the	intellectual	
property	regime,	development	of	the	early	stage	financing	infrastructure,	strengthening	knowledge	networks	
and	facilitating	spillovers.	
Achieving	 structural	 transformation	 of	 the	 region	 is	 a	 challenge	 that	 extends	 beyond	 research	 and	
innovation	 policies.	 Trade	 policy,	 technology	 absorption	 and	 adoption,	 business	 environment	 and	 the	
regulations	 that	govern	 the	human	capital	 input	are	directly	 related	 to	 the	entrepreneurial	environment.	
Policy	setting	in	these	areas	naturally	involves	a	more	complex	institutional	framework	than	the	boundaries	
of	research	and	innovation	policy.		To	be	more	specific,	the	entrepreneurial	environment	is	shaped	by	a	whole	
host	 of	 policies	 including	 labor	market	 regulation,	 education	 policy	 (strong	 primary,	 secondary,	 tertiary,	
vocational	 and	 higher	 education);	 health	 policy	 (which	 helps	 provide	 security	 for	 the	 entrepreneur);	 the	
regulatory	environment;	business	taxation	and	the	judicial	system	(Acs,	2012).	Rigid	business	regulation	may	
deteriorate	entry	conditions,	hindering	the	entrepreneurial	capacity	of	the	region.	
“Self	 discovery”	 is	 heavily	dependent	on	entry	 conditions,	with	 fewer	discoveries	occurring	 in	 systems	
burdened	 by	 barriers	 to	 entry.	Klinger	 and	 Lederman	 (2011)	 document	 the	 strong	 correlation	 between	
government	regulation	and	self	discovery.	The	higher	the	regulatory	burden,	the	fewer	export	discoveries	
are	made,	despite	the	threat	of	allowing	imitators	in	the	newly	discovered	sectors.	In	fact,	imitation	tends	to	
increase	welfare	in	many	new	sectors	as	it	increases	the	scope	for	social	returns	from	these	activities.	The	
government,	 which	 has	 an	 incentive	 to	 support	 such	 discoveries	 should	 then	 consider	 addressing	 entry	
barriers.			
Is	 knowledge	 the	 binding	 constraint	 against	 the	 structural	 transformation	 of	 the	 region?	 This	 is	 a	 key	
question	that	needs	to	be	answered	by	the	region	while	designing	its	smart	specialization	roadmap.	If	the	
binding	constraint	relates	to	a	more	fundamental	structural	bottleneck,	such	as	the	regulatory	environment	
or	 physical	 infrastructure,	 then	 the	 region	 should	 prioritize	 addressing	 such	 constraint,	while	 taking	 into	
consideration	the	next	steps	in	research	and	innovation	in	its	medium	or	long	term	agenda.	For	instance	if	
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the	business	regulatory	framework	for	establishing	a	company	is	heavily	complicated	by	red	tape,	then	taking	
measures	to	generate	university	spin	offs	may	prove	to	be	insufficient	in	stimulating	the	desired	structural	
transformation	of	the	local	economy.		
Identification	of	regional	bottlenecks	against	structural	transformation.	Having	established	whether	or	not	
knowledge	 is	 a	 binding	 constraint,	 the	 strategy	 should	 then	 sketch	 more	 specifically	 what	 the	 binding	
constraints	are,	and	which	ones	to	address	in	the	short,	medium	and	long	terms.	Knowledge	bottleneck(s)	
may	relate	to	a	number	of	 institutional	factors,	mainly	arising	 in	one	or	more	of	the	following	aspects:	(i)	
constraints	 to	 increasing	private	R&D	and	 innovation	 investment	 (access	 to	 finance,	 intellectual	property	
protection,	incentive	schemes),	(ii)	constraints	to	improving	technology	adoption	by	SMEs	(skill	mismatches,	
ease	of	access	to	technology,	awareness),	(iii)	constraints	to	research	excellence	(skilled	labor,	partnerships).	
The	right	policy	mix	is	not	necessarily	related	to	research	and	innovation	policy,	but	it	is	one	that	enables	
the	“self	discovery”	process.	The	nature	of	entrepreneurial	activity	is	to	experiment	with	new	product	niches,	
discovering	the	cost	of	these	activities	and	abandoning	those	that	cannot	be	undertaken	at	a	sufficiently	low	
cost	to	prove	profitable.	As	Rodrik	(2004)	elaborates,	the	discovery	of	such	cost	does	not	necessarily	arise	
from	inventing	a	product	or	process	that	is	new	to	the	world,	although	it	may	well	be.	Such	discovery	may	
even	arise	from	adopting	a	technology	to	produce	a	traditional	product	or	undertake	a	well-known	process	
at	a	lower	cost.		Another	route	is	to	adapt	the	product	or	process	to	local	conditions	in	a	more	efficient	way	
than	the	competition.	
The	smart	specialization	strategy	can	be	designed	as	a	long	term	plan	to	install	and	continually	review	the	
policy	framework	through	integrated	impact	evaluation	and	iterative	learning.	This	long	term	strategy	is	
envisaged	to:	(i)	determine	the	overall	objective	and	relevant	measurable	goals,	(ii)	identify	bottlenecks	and	
market	failures,	and	(iii)	experiment,	learn	from	these	experiments,	and	then	adapt	the	policies	accordingly.	
The	“identification	stage”	consists	of	the	tasks	(i)	and	(ii),	after	which	the	“experimentation	and	adaptation	
stage”	follows.	Each	stage	can	be	guided	by	a	checklist	of	questions	as	listed	later.			
Importantly,	the	strategy	identifies	channels	through	which	measurable	development	objectives	can	be	
achieved	via	flexible	policy	interventions.	The	monitoring	and	evaluation	framework	should	therefore	be	
embedded	in	all	stages	of	the	smart	specialization	strategy.	Progress	towards	these	measurable	development	
objectives	 can	 be	 monitored	 through	 intermediate	 outcomes	 and	 influenced	 by	 means	 of	 flexible	
interventions.	In	other	words,	the	policy	maker	works	backwards	from	the	desired	final	outcomes,	identifying	
the	main	channels	through	which	these	outcomes	could	be	achieved	via	proposed	interventions.		
Understanding	the	incentives	for	lobbying	for	all	key	stakeholders,	both	public	and	private,	may	help	to	
mitigate	(but	not	completely	eliminate)	some	issues	concerning	the	political	economy	of	lobbying.		Several	
private	and	public	actors,	or	different	levels	of	government	may	compete	or	collaborate	while	defending	the	
interests	of	a	large	set	of	related	parties.	In	regions	where	limited	or	no	information	is	available	to	the	policy	
maker,	the	problem	is	particularly	severe	and	more	difficult	to	alleviate	by	such	examination.	 It	would	be	
expected	in	these	regions	that	the	benefits	to	related	parties	are	less	obvious,	and	hence	more	difficult	to	
analyze.	
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The	following	checklist	provides	a	set	of	questions	that	may	guide	the	characterization	of	a	region	prior	to	
designing	a	smart	specialization	strategy.	
Fully	 integrating	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 to	 policies	 and	 programs	 is	 essential	 to	 allow	 systematic	
learning	and	 improvement.	Rather	than	ex	ante	targeting	certain	areas,	 research	and	 innovation	policies	
could	focus	on	identifying	the	intermediate	goals,	the	channels	through	which	these	goals	are	meant	to	be	
achieved,	and	the	bottlenecks	–	market	and	institutional	failures	–	that	reduce	the	chances	of	success.		Public	
actions	 would	 then	 tentatively	 aim	 at	 correcting	 such	 failures;	 be	 monitored	 and	 evaluated,	 as	 well	 as	
adjusted	based	on	lessons	acquired	through	systematic	learning.	Recognizing	that	there	are	no	pre-defined	
policy	 recipes	 when	 economic	 specialization	 is	 not	 immediately	 evident	 implies	 raising	 the	 relevance	 of	
results-orientation	 as	 well	 as	 the	 integration	 of	 proper	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 mechanisms	 into	
policy/program	implementation.	
In	 order	 to	 raise	 the	 impact	 of	 research	 and	 innovation	 on	 regional	 and	 national	 development,	
governments	 could	 focus	 their	 interventions	 around	 a	 small	 number	 of	 measurable	 intermediate	
objectives	with	a	clear	direct	link	with	the	broader	development	goal	of	higher	growth	and	job	creation,	as	
for	instance:	
Accelerating	the	commercialization	of	public	research	and	academic	entrepreneurship	through	licensing	and	
spin	off	companies;		
Increasing	 the	 collaboration	between	public	 research	organizations	with	 the	 local	 private	 sector	 through	
organic	research	collaboration;		
Promoting	business	expenditure	in	R&D	and	innovation,	including	new	business	models,	and	the	number	of	
firms	engaged	in	innovation	activities;		
Reforming	the	system	of	managing	public	research	organizations	to	favor	talented	research	and	performance	
(excellence	 and	 productivity),	 as	 well	 as	 skills	 formation,	 all	 underlying	 factors	 for	 successful	 smart	
specialization.		
Enabling	 faster	adoption	of	updated	 technologies	and	organization	processes	 (especially	general	purpose	
technologies	by	small	and	medium	sized	companies,	ICT	by	the	service	sector).	
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Table	1.	Identification	stage,	examples	
Goal	 Bottleneck	 Instruments	 Measure	of	success	
Incentivizing	R&D	
expenditure	
Financing	 Alternative	credit	lines	 #	firms	engaged	in	
innovation;	proportion	of	
spending	on	R&D	Incentives	 Matching	grants	
Accelerate	R&D	
commercialization	
Business	skills	(academia)	 Entrepreneurial	training	 Licensing	of	spin	off	
companies;		patents	
Early	Stage	Financing	 Angel	investors	
Improve	technology	
adoption	by	SMEs	
Awareness	 Information	campaigns	 Take	up	rates	of	targeted	
technologies	Skills	 Training	Programs	
Research	Excellence	
Retention	of	skilled	labor	
force	
Non-financial	incentive	
schemes	 Academic	qualifications;	
Quality	of	publication	
output;	Publication	
collaborations	
Coordination	/	
collaboration	
Workshops	/	international	
conferences	
	
	
Selected	research	and	innovation	policies,	programs	and	investments	would	therefore	directly	contribute	
to	one	of	the	previously	selected	 intermediate	goals	and	be	evaluated	accordingly.	They	would	address	
identified	market	and	institutional	failures,	and	be	designed	and	implemented	in	a	way	consistent	with	robust	
evaluation,	thus	informing	subsequent	adjustment	towards	a	higher	impact.		Such	approach	would	help,	in	
particular,	to	rationalize	the	relevance	of	investments	in	research	infrastructure	that	tend	to	encompass	a	
large	share	of	research	and	innovation	investments	financed	by	the	structural	funds.	
In	the	case	of	commercialization	of	public	research,	for	instance,	regions	could	experiment	with	programs	
addressing	 the	 supply	 of	 ideas	 originating	 from	 public	 research	 organizations	 --	 from	 	 supporting	 better	
intellectual	property	management	practices	by	technology	transfer	offices	to	the	provision	of	small	grants	
for	the	development	of	proof	of	concepts;	and/or	with	programs	promoting	the	demand	for	such	ideas,	such	
as	 supporting	 angel	 investments	 (for	 example,	 accelerator	 programs),	 	 according	 to	 their	 specific	
circumstances.	
In	the	case	of	adoption	of	ICT,	the	lower	usage	levels	of	European	firms	as	compared	to	their	US	peers	derives	
from	 relatively	 lower	 returns	 from	 ICT	 investments	 in	 Europe	 due	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 less	 efficient	
management	 (organizational)	practices	and	higher	product	market	 regulation	–	which	prevent	 local	 firms	
from	reaping	the	same	level	of	benefits	as	their	US	counterparts.19	Hence,	there	is	no	obvious	indication	of	
whether	and	which	type	of	policies	could	help	increase	the	productivity	of	ICT	and	increase	its	use	in	Europe.			
Experimentation	may	 also	 be	 related	 to	 the	 design	 of	 support	mechanism.	 For	 instance,	 in	 promoting	
collaboration	between	public	research	organizations	and	the	private	sector,	one	of	the	important	variables	
may	be	the	targeted	population.	Under	certain	conditions,	which	are	difficult	to	identify	upfront,	eliminating	
																																																													
19	(Bloom,	Sadun,	&	van	Reenen,	2012).		The	Europe	2020	Flagship	Initiative	Innovation	Union	(COM(2010)546)	argues	
that	another	reason	for	the	gap	is	the	low	level	of	investment	in	ICT	equipment	which	remain	below	the	threshold	ICT	
that	could	potentially	allow	the	private	sector	to	reap	the	benefits	of	ICT	investments;	and	modest	progress	in	innovative	
activity	by	European	businesses	and	inadequate	research	infrastructure	which	unleash	the	productivity	gains	from	ICT	
investment.	If	the	underlying	reason	is	the	level	of	ICT	investment	that	remains	below	a	potential	efficiency	threshold,	
then	the	reinforcement	suggested	by	the	EU	could	help	
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the	possibility	of	the	private	sector	sponsoring	project	applications	may	result	in	a	large	share	of	the	funds	
being	unused	(especially	when	other	standard	sources	of	public	financing	for	public	research	are	generously	
available).			
	
Table	2.	Experimentation	and	Adaptation	Stage	
	
	
	
The	assessment	of	 innovation	policies	 is	 still	 in	 its	 initial	 stages,	especially	 in	new	member	countries	and	
despite	the	significant	emphasis	placed	by	the	EC.		Yet,	motivated	by	the	Lisbon	Agenda	and	more	recently	
the	Europe	2020	Strategy,	new	member	countries	are	encouraged	to	commit	more	resources	to	research	and	
innovation	 (for	 example,	 1.5	 and	2	 percent	 of	GDP	 in	Bulgaria	 and	Romania	 respectively).	 The	proposed	
results-based	framework	could	help	governments	better	deploy	additional	resources	to	promote	research,	
development	and	innovation.	It	may	also	help	government	to	establish	a	clear	strategy	to	achieve	related	
goals	established	under	their	innovation	strategies	(such	as	1	percent	of	GDP	invested	by	the	private	sector,	
as	 in	the	case	of	Romania).	Finally,	 it	will	help	governments	of	New	Member	States	to	 identify	remaining	
areas	of	critical	institutional	reforms	to	complete	the	transition	of	their	innovation	systems.	
	 	
Question/Goal
•Selection/picking
•R&D promotion
•Commercialization
•…
Target group
•Entrepreneurs
•Researchers / 
academics
•Public/private 
Institutions
•Venture capitalists
•Angel investors
•Banks
•…
Identify market failure
•Lack of credit
•Poor property rights
•Coordination failure
•Labor market 
mismatch/skills 
shortage
•Lack of insurance 
market
•…
Market failure critical 
assessment 
•Eg. lack of credit: 
•Why?
•Intangible collateral
•High (uninsured) risk
•Asymmetric 
information
•…
Intervention design
•Matching grant
•Tax break
•Scholarships
•Investment climate 
reforms
•Networking events
•Academic incentives 
(financial and non-
financial)
•Guaranteed loans
Experimentation and 
iteration
•Within and across 
interventions (eg. 
combinations vs. 
variations)
•Eg. Variations in cost-
sharing agreements;  
criteria for credit, 
alternative insurance 
schemes, various 
information 
campaigns…
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Smart	Specialization	Proposed	Checklist		
-	Identification	Stage	-	
Is	there	any	obvious	comparative	advantage	of	the	region	based	on	existing	economic	activity?		
Is	there	a	latent	comparative	advantage	based	on	an	immovable	asset	that	could	be	a	source	of	wealth	
creation?	
Is	knowledge	a	binding	constraint	hindering	the	structural	transformation	of	the	region?	
	
If	knowledge	is	a	binding	constraint:	
		
Will	research	and	innovation	policy	help	in	addressing	these	bottlenecks?	
Does	the	bottleneck	relate	to	research	and	development	infrastructure?	
Does	the	bottleneck	relate	to	technology	adoption	and	absorption?		
Does	the	bottleneck	relate	to	the	entrepreneurship	environment?		
What	are	the	alternatives	for	the	appropriate	policy	mix	to	address	the	identified	market	failure?	
	
If	there	are	other	fundamental	binding	constraints	that	relate	to	the	success	of	a	cluster20	in	achieving	
structural	transformation,	are	these	related	to:	
	
Inadequate	infrastructure	service	delivery?	
Financial	market	imperfections	that	limit	financing	to	firms?	
Weak	state	capacity	(adverse	regulatory	framework/poor	implementation	of	regulations)?	
Weak	private	investor	capacity	(SMEs:		inadequate	technical	or	market	knowledge)?	
State	coordination	failure	(different	ministries,	municipalities,	etc)?	
Private	coordination	failure	(first	mover	costs)?	
Availability	of	land,	land	tenure	systems	and	mechanisms	to	access	land,	pricing	mechanisms,	etc.	
(in	all	agribusiness	growth	poles	the	issue	of	land	and	the	determinants	of	accessing	it	should	be	
given	a	central	role)?	
Lack	of	critical	mass?	
Inadequate	learning	mechanisms?	
	
Which	 are	 the	 areas	 of	 high	 risk?	 Identify	 specific,	 potential	 sources	 of	 risks	 based	 on	 existing	 data.	
External	risks	(such	as	monetary	shocks,	economic	recession,	price	fall),	country	risks	(such	as	political	
instability,	 land	tenure/property	rights),	and	regional	risks	(such	as	drought,	natural	disasters)	directly	
affect	 the	 likelihood	 of	 success.	 	 Some	 of	 these	 could	 be	 addressed	 through	 mitigation	 actions	 and	
integrated	into	the	project	design.	
How	is	the	causal	chain	between	actions,	intermediate	outcomes	and	final	outcomes	characterized?		
What	is	the	development	objective	of	the	national	smart	specialization	strategy?	In	what	ways	
does	that	concern	the	region?		
What	is	the	development	objective	of	the	regional	smart	specialization	strategy?	
How	can	the	development	objective	be	broken	down	into	one	or	several	intermediate	outcomes?	
What	types	of	actions	should	be	taken	to	address	the	identified	bottlenecks?	
What	is	the	sequence	of	actions,	and	through	which	mechanisms	are	these	actions	planned	to	
solve	the	identified	bottlenecks?	
	
What	are	the	key	monitoring	indicators	identified?	
Who	is	accountable	for	monitoring?	Who	monitors	the	relevant	variables	and	in	what	periodicity?	
																																																													
20	For	the	case	with	other	factors	than	knowledge	as	the	binding	constraint	and	the	impact	evaluation	framework,	
components	are	adapted	from	the	World	Bank	Africa	Financial	and	Private	Sector	Development	Framework	for	
the	Design	and	Implementation	of	Growth	Poles	Projects		
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Are	the	indicators	derived	from	the	development	objectives,	intermediate	outcomes	or	actions?	Are	they	
verifiable	and	objective?	
How	 is	 the	 institutional	 setting	 that	 may	 affect	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 various	 components	 of	 the	
strategy	and	individual	projects	put	in	place	as	part	of	the	strategy?	
Who	are	the	key	stakeholders?	
What	is	their	interest	in	the	project?	Are	there	important	officials	or	entities	with	limited	or	no	
interest	 in	the	success	of	the	strategy,	or	 in	particular	project	components?	For	example,	 local	
officials	may	be	motivated	by	the	 increase	 in	 local	 revenues	generated	by	some	effects	of	 the	
policy,	with	limited	or	no	interest	in,	addressing	the	bottlenecks.		
Are	there	important	officials	or	entities	that	might	want	to	block	or	slow	down	the	project,	or	any	
particular	project	component?	Are	there	firms	that	are	likely	to	benefit	from	monopoly/oligopoly	
rents?	
Are	there	important	stakeholders	that	might	want	to	capture	the	project,	or	any	particular	project	
component?		
	
-	Experimentation	and	Adaptation	Stage	-	
What	are	the	feedback	mechanisms	available	in	the	given	policy	mix?		
Is	the	policy	mix	targeting	sectors	or	instruments?	Or	is	a	combination	of	interventions	put	in	place?	
Has	 the	 pilot	 policy	 mix	 been	 successful	 in	 achieving	 the	 intermediate	 goals	 determined	 in	 the	
identification	stage?			
Have	the	intermediate	goals	changed	since	the	pilot	policy	launch?	(If	so,	revisit	the	identification	stage)	
Have	 the	monitoring	 indicators	 changed	 since	 the	 pilot	 policy	 launch?	 (If	 so,	 revisit	 the	 identification	
stage)	
What	are	the	external	factors	affecting	the	results?		
Are	the	risks	identified	in	the	identification	stage	likely	to	be	realized?	Did	additional	risks	emerge?	
Are	there	any	other	concerns	that	may	influence	the	impact	such	as	coordination	problems	and	timing	of	
interventions,	or	data	availability?	
Were	impact	evaluation	studies	undertaken	for	the	experimented	policies?		
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Conclusions	
The	prioritization	of	selected	economic	sectors	through	a	broad	consultative	process	is	often	considered	a	
central	aspect	of	research	and	innovation	policies	aiming	at	promoting	smart	specialization	(RIS3).	Targeted	
research	and	innovation	policies	are	seen	as	an	effort	to	reduce	fragmentation	and	a	way	to	increase	the	
impact	of	research	and	innovation	investments	on	regional	and	national	development.	They	also	relate	to	
the	understanding	that	the	strategies	of	the	current	Programming	Period	did	not	achieve	the	desired	goals.	
Targeting	research	and	innovation	policies,	however,	may	not	be	always	recommendable	due	to	 inherent	
problems	of	 incomplete	 information	and	 the	 inevitable	 representation	bias	 towards	 incumbent	 interests.	
When	 the	 economic	 specialization	 of	 a	 region	 is	 not	 immediately	 evident	 from	observation	 of	market	
dynamics,	 policy-makers	 should	 be	 encouraged	 to	 adopt	measures	 that	 enable	 the	 process	 of	market	
selection,	allowing	such	specialization	to	emerge	as	a	result	of	entry,	exit	and	experimentation.		
Research	and	innovation	policies	can	play	a	major	role	in	fostering	entrance	of	knowledge	–based	startups,	
innovation	and	technology	adoption	–	i.e.	contributing	to	an	eco-system	that	nurtures	the	creation	of	high	
growth	potential	 firms.	Other	policies	that	facilitate	entry	and	encourage	technological	modernization	–	
e.g.	promoting	competition,	providing	access	to	credit,	skills	and	information,	and	facilitating	market	exit	
–	are	equally	relevant.	Their	adoption	can	leverage,	in	some	cases	become	a	pre-condition	for,	the	impact	
of	research	and	innovation	measures	on	economic	development.	Because	such	policies	and	programs	are	
hard	to	define	upfront,	some	experimentation	(and	failure)	will	be	inevitable.	
The	paper	also	explored	circumstances	 in	which	targeted	research	and	 innovation	policies	may	be	useful,	
namely,	when	information	on	the	economic	specialization	of	the	region	or	the	country	 is	fully	or	partially	
available,	through	some	sort	of	‘market	test’.	In	such	cases,	research	and	innovation	policies	may	help	sound	
companies	 to	 keep	 a	 competitive	 edge	 in	 international	 markets	 or	 to	 cope	 with	 growing	 international	
competition	 (shaping	 comparative	 advantages)	 or	 simply	 support	 potentially	 high	 growth	 companies	 to	
realize	their	potential	(unleashing		 latent	comparative	advantages).	For	different	reasons,	these	situations	
are	likely	to	be	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule.	
In	our	view,	the	above	approach	would	have	at	least	two	immediate	implications	for	RIS3	worth	taking	into	
account:			
Replacing	the	emphasis	on	ex-ante	definition	of	sectors	and	full	commitment	of	resources	up-front	
with	a	results-based	approach	in	which	some	flexibility	for	policy/program	experimentation	and	ex-post	
allocation	of	resources	based	on	results	is	granted;		
Fully	 integrating	monitoring	 and	 evaluating	mechanisms	 in	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	
research	 and	 innovation	 strategy,	 allowing	 for	 structured	 learning	 and	 systematic	 adjustment	 of	
programs	and	policies	towards	the	pre-defined	objectives.		
These	 recommendations	 seem	 not	 too	 far	 from	 the	 views	 conveyed	 by	 the	 Commission	 on	 different	
occasions.	 	 It	 is	 also	 consistent	 with	 an	 emphasis	 placed	 by	 the	 Commission,	 the	 OECD	 and	 other	
organizations	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 adequate	monitoring,	 evaluation	 and	 learning	 for	 the	 adaptation	 of	
research	and	innovation	policy	for	diverse	and	changing	circumstances.	A	smart	specialization	strategy	would	
thus	be	a	“living”	document,	as	recommended	by	the	Guidelines	and	a	management	tool	for	better	use	of	
public	expenditures	in	research	and	innovation,	as	advocated	by	the	Innovation	Union	Report.		
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Data	analysis:	information	on	the	specialization	of	the	economy	
	
Identification	of	 latent	comparative	advantage	 in	the	R&D,	 innovation	and	technology	context	has	two	
components.	The	first	component	 is	an	assessment	of	the	existing	strengths	of	the	economy,	which	is	an	
analysis	of	the	institutional	setup	and	the	observed	comparative	advantage.	The	second	component	involves	
an	attempt	to	investigate	the	latent	comparative	advantage.		
The	first	component	 implies	a	stocktaking	exercise	of	the	region’s	observed	strengths	and	weaknesses.	
This	involves	the	review	of	existing	industry	trends	and	of	economic	specialization21	in	the	country	or	region	
with	a	complementary	analysis	of	the	potential	distortions	generated	by	current	economic	policies.		Examples	
of	distortionary	policies	 include:	state	protection	 in	the	 industry;	tariffs,	subsidies,	 technical	or	regulatory	
barriers	to	entry;	the	degree	of	dominance	of	state-owned	enterprises	in	the	economy;	and	other	monetary	
or	non-monetary	subsidies	directly	available	to	stimulate	the	growth	of	the	sector.	Benchmarking	the	region’s	
intra-industry	innovative	activity	against	international	comparators	is	a	crucial	component	of	this	stocktaking	
exercise.		
The	second	component	involves	an	analysis	of	the	potential	to	unlock	latent	comparative	advantages.	A	
survey	of	emerging	global	trends	in	technology	and	innovation,	complemented	with	an	assessment	of	the	
region’s	potential	 in	 advancing	 in	 some	areas	may	 shed	 light	on	 the	potential	 avenues	 for	development.	
David,	Foray	and	Hall	(2009)	conjecture	that	the	local	potential	will	be	related	to	the	already	existing	sectors	
in	the	region	or	country.	As	an	example	to	a	follower	strategy,	they	suggest	an	examination	of	the	patenting	
activity	 by	 firms	 in	 the	 same	 sector	 located	 in	 other	 regions	 of	 the	world	 to	measure	 the	 prospects	 for	
catching	up.		
Joint	work	by	the	Commission	and	the	OECD22	is	underway	to	compile	a	general	set	of	indicators	to	assess	
the	degree	of	specialization	in	each	region.	The	project	consists	of	four	stages:	(i)	identification	of	indicator-
based	 specialization	profiles23,	 (ii)	preparation	of	 templates	 for	 strategic	governance	profiles	of	 countries	
involved	in	the	project,	(iii)	construction	of	strategic	governance	profiles,	and	(iv)	preparation	of	one	or	two	
case	studies	per	country.		
Indicators	used	to	assess	trade	competitiveness	provide	valuable	guidance,	as	the	capacity	of	a	region	in	
terms	 of	 innovation	 and	 technology	 is	 part	 of	 the	 ‘trade	 promotion	 infrastructure’.	 A	 Trade	
Competitiveness	 Diagnostic	 (TCD)	 (Farole	 &	 Reis,	 2012)	 comprises	 three	 modules:	 (1)	 Trade	 outcomes	
																																																													
21	Economic	specialization	can	be	measured	by	the	revealed	comparative	advantage	(RCA).	The	RCA	for	product	k	
in	country	i	is	the	export	of	product	k	relative	to	the	country’s	total	exports	divided	by	the	world	export	of	
product	k	relative	to	total	world	exports	(Farole	and	Reis,	2012).	
22	TIP	Project	on	Smart	Specialization,	DSTI/STP/TIP/AH(2012)1,	introduced	earlier.	
23	Indicators	identified	in	stage	(i)	are	divided	into	categories,	according	to	the	data	used:	(a)	data	on	scientific	
research:	an	‘activity	index’	tracing	down	the	importance	of	a	country’s	publications	relative	to	its	size	and	field,	
and	specialization	based	on	a	classification	of	scientific	disciplines;	(b)	data	on	technology,	namely,	patent-based	
measures;	(c)	economic	specialization	indicators.	
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analysis;	 (2)	Competitiveness	diagnostics;	and	 (3)	Policy	options	 for	 competitiveness	and	case	 studies.	To	
attain	a	comprehensive	view	of	the	region’s	strengths	and	weaknesses,	a	full	TCD	analysis	would	be	highly	
recommended.	A	TCD	may	help	identify	whether	the	binding	constraint	in	the	region	is	technology-related	
or	not,	thereby	increasing	the	prospects	for	estimating	the	potential	for	smart	specialization	to	trigger	growth	
in	the	region.		
Finally,	 field	 work	 involving	 interviews,	 surveys,	 and	 tools	 such	 as	 value	 chain	 and/or	 product	 space	
analyses	can	be	undertaken	to	complement	the	desk	work	outlined	above.	The	drawback	of	interviews	is	
that	each	stakeholder	might	present	their	subjective	view	and	may	have	personal	or	institutional	benefits	
from	supporting	a	certain	standpoint.	Farole	and	Reis	(2012)	present	a	set	of	interview	targets	and	issues	for	
discussion	 as	 part	 of	 the	qualitative	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘trade	promotion	 infrastructure’.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	
surveys	 need	 to	 be	 carefully	 designed	 to	 lead	 to	 an	 objective	 assessment.	 Value	 chain	 analyses	 provide	
product-level	 information	 with	 a	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 range	 of	 processes	 from	 the	 source	 of	 the	
product	to	its	end-user.	
Box	4	:	Value	chain	analysis		
	
Source:	Farole	and	Reis	(2012),	from	World	Bank	(2009),	Clusters	for	Competitiveness:	A	Practical	Guide	&	Policy	Implications	for	
Developing	Countries,	Washington,	DC:	World	Bank;	Gereffi,	G.	and	Frederick,	S.	(2010),	Global	Apparel	Value	China,	Trade,	and	the	Crisis:	
Challenges	and	Opportunities	for	Developing	Countries,	Policy	Research	Working	Paper	5281,	World	Bank	
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Box	5.	Product	space	analysis	
	
[…]The	hypothesis	is	that	countries	that	build	up	competence	in	producing	a	certain	good	
can	redeploy	their	human,	physical	and	institutional	capital	more	easily	if	they	seek	to	
produce	goods	that	are	“nearby”	those	that	they	are	producing	already.	Proximity	between	
products	on	a	product	space	is	computed	from	the	pair-wise	likelihood	that	a	country	
exports	a	product	given	that	it	also	exports	another	product.		
Proximity	between	any	two	goods	(m	and	n)	is	the	minimum	of	the	pair-wise	conditional	
probabilities	of	having	comparative	advantage.	
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[…]Whether	a	country’s	exports	in	which	it	has	comparative	advantage	are	located	in	the	
denser	part	of	the	product	space	or	in	the	periphery	can	predict	the	ease	with	which	that	
country	transforms	itself	economically.	Structural	transformations	are	not		smooth		
movements		along		a		continuum		but		a		messy		process		beset		by		market		failures.		When	
such	market	failures	are	binding,	it	is	harder	for	firms	to	hop	longer	distances	without	
government	coordination	and	support.		Because		products		do		not		evolve		in		sequence,		
i.e.,		having		iron		ore		deposits		does		not	necessarily		make		a		country		an		efficient		steel		
producer,		lateral-linkages		are		as		or		more		important		than	forward-linkages	with	
downstream	industries.		
Source:	Farole	and	Reis	(2012),	p.71	
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ANNEX	II	
Thematic	ex	ante	conditionality	for	the	use	of	Structural	Fund	programs	
		
COM(2011)615: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European  Social Fund, the 
Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, 
Annex IV: 
First two of eleven ex ante conditionalities: 
Thematic objectives Ex ante conditionality Criteria for fulfilment 
1. Strengthening 
research, technological 
development and 
innovation (R&D 
target)  
(referred to in Art.9(1)) 
1.1. Research and innovation: The 
existence of a national or regional 
research and innovation strategy for 
smart specialisation in line with the 
National  Reform Program, to 
leverage private research and 
innovation expenditure, which 
complies with the features of well-
performing national or regional 
research and innovation systems. 
–A national or regional research and innovation  strategy for 
smart specialisation is in place that: is based on a SWOT 
analysis to concentrate resources on a limited set of research 
and innovation priorities; outlines measures to stimulate private 
RTD investment; contains a monitoring and review system. 
–A Member State has adopted a framework outlining available 
budgetary resources for research and innovation;  
–A  Member  State  has  adopted  a  multi-annual  plan  for  
budgeting  and  prioritization  of investments   linked   to   EU   
priorities   (European   Strategy   Forum   on   Research 
Infrastructures -ESFRI). 
2.  Enhancing access  
to  and  use and   
quality of information       
and communication 
technologies 
(Broadband target)  
(referred to in Art.9(2)) 
2.1. Digital growth: The existence 
within the national or regional    
innovation strategy for smart  
specialisation of an explicit chapter 
for digital growth to stimulate 
demand for affordable, good quality 
and interoperable  ICT-enabled 
private and public  services  and  
increase uptake  by  citizens, 
including  vulnerable groups, 
businesses and public administrations 
including cross  border initiatives. 
A  chapter  for  digital  growth  within  the  national  or  
regional  innovation  strategy  for smart specialisation is in 
place that contains:  
–  budgeting and prioritisation of actions through a SWOT 
analysis carried out in alignment with the Scoreboard of the 
Digital Agenda for Europe;  
– analysis of balancing support for demand and supply of ICT 
should have been conducted;  
– measurable targets for outcomes of interventions in the field 
of digital literacy, skills,  e-inclusion,  e-accessibility,  and  e-
health  which  are  aligned  with  existing relevant sectoral 
national or regional strategies.  
–  assessment of needs to reinforce ICT capacity-building. 
2.2. Next Generation Access   (NGA) 
Infrastructure: The existence of 
national NGA Plans   which take 
account of regional actions in order 
to reach the EU high-speed Internet 
access targets, focusing on areas 
where the  market fails to provide an 
open  infrastructure at an affordable  
cost and to an adequate quality in  
line  with  the  EU  competition and   
state aid rules, and provide accessible 
services to vulnerable groups. 
A national NGA Plan is in place that contains:  
–  a plan of infrastructure investments through demand 
aggregation and a mapping of infrastructure and services, 
regularly updated;  
– sustainable  investment  models  that  enhance  competition  
and  provide  access to open, affordable, quality and future 
proof infrastructure and services;   
– measures to stimulate private investment. 
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ANNEX	III	
Full	Decision	Tree:	A	typology	for	smart	specialization	and	policy	implications	
	STEP I: Specialization STEP II: Bottlenecks 
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